Fully homomorphic encryption is an encryption method with the property that any computation on the plaintext can be performed by a party having access to the ciphertext only. Here, we formally define and give schemes for quantum homomorphic encryption, which is the encryption of quantum information such that quantum computations can be performed given the ciphertext only. Our schemes allows for arbitrary Clifford group gates, but become inefficient for circuits with large complexity, measured in terms of the non-Clifford portion of the circuit (we use the "π/8" non-Clifford group gate, which is also known as the T-gate).
Contents
1 Introduction
Summary of Contributions and Techniques
We introduce schemes for quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE), the quantum version of classical homomorphic encryption; we are thus interested in establishing functionality for the evaluation of quantum circuits on encrypted quantum data. In terms of definitions, we contribute by giving the first definition of quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE) in the computational setting, in the case of both public-key and symmetric-key cryptosystems. As a consequence, we give the first formal definition (and scheme) for the public-key encryption of quantum information, where security is given in terms of quantum indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks-for which we show the equivalence of a number of definitions, including security for multiple messages.
In terms of QHE schemes, we start by using straightforward techniques to construct a scheme that is homomorphic for Clifford circuits (or, more generally, stabilizer circuits). This can be seen as an analogue to a classical scheme that is homomorphic for linear circuits (circuits performing only additions). While stabilizer circuits are not universal for quantum computation, this already yields a range of applications for quantum information processing, including encoding and decoding into stabilizer codes. More specifically, our quantum public-key encryption scheme is a hybrid of a classical public-key fully homomorphic encryption scheme and the quantum one-time pad [AMTW00] . Intuitively, the scheme works by encrypting the quantum register with a quantum one-time pad, and then encrypting the one-time pad encryption keys with a classical public-key FHE scheme. Since Clifford circuits conjugate Pauli operators to Pauli operators, any Clifford circuit can be directly applied to the encrypted quantum register; the homomorphic property of the classical encryption scheme is used to update the encryption key. Of course, we specify that the classical FHE scheme should be secure against quantum adversaries. By using, e.g., the scheme from [BV11] , we get security based on the learning with errors (LWE) assumption [Reg05, Reg09] ; this has been equated with worst-case hardness of "short vector problems" on arbitrary lattices [MR09] , which is widely believed to be a quantum-safe (or "post-quantum") assumption.
For universal quantum computations, we must evaluate a non-Clifford group gate, for which we choose the "T" gate (also known as "R" or "π/8") gate. Applying the above principle we run into trouble, since TX a Z b = X a Z a⊕b P a T. That is, conditioned on the quantum one-time pad encryption key a, b ∈ {0, 1}, the output picks up an undesirable non-Pauli error. Our main contribution is to present two schemes, EPR and AUX, that deal with this situation in two different ways:
1. The main idea of EPR (named after the famous Einstein-Podolski-Rosen trio [EPR35] ) is to use entangled quantum registers to enable corrections within the circuit at the time of decryption. This scheme is efficient for any quantum circuit, however, it fails to meet a requirement for fully homomorphic encryption called compactness, which requires that the complexity of the decryption procedure be independent of the evaluated circuit. More specifically, the complexity of the decryption procedure for EPR scales with the square of the number of T-gates. This gives an advantage over the trivial scheme whenever the number of T-gates in the evaluated circuit is less than the squareroot of the number of gates. (The trivial scheme consists of appending to the ciphertext a description of the circuit to be evaluated, and specifying that it should be applied as part of the decryption procedure.)
2. Compared to EPR, the scheme AUX takes a more pro-active approach to performing the correction required for a T-gate: to do this, it uses a number of auxiliary qubits that are given as part of the evaluation key. Intuitively, these auxiliary qubits encode the required corrections. In order to ensure universality, a large number of possible corrections must be available -the length of the evaluation key is thus given by a polynomial of degree exponential in the circuit's T-gate depth, yielding a homomorphic scheme that is efficient for quantum circuits with constant T-depth.
Note that the two main schemes EPR and AUX are incomparable; for some circuits, EPR is more desirable, while for others, it is preferable to use AUX. The scheme EPR becomes less compact (and therefore less interesting, since it approaches the trivial scheme), as the number of T-gates increases, while the scheme AUX becomes inefficient (extremely rapidly) as the depth of T-gates increases.
Our results can be viewed as a quantum analogue of precursory results to classical fully homomorphic encryption, which established the homomorphic property of encryption schemes that tolerate a limited amount of operations. One difference is that, while these schemes started with the very modest goal of just a single multiplication (the addition operation being "easy"), we have already allowed for at the very least a constant number, and, depending on the circuit, up to a polynomial number of "hard" operations, namely of T-gates.
Our schemes use the existence of classical FHE, although at the expense of a slightly more complicated exposition, a classical scheme that is homomorphic only for linear circuits would actually suffice. We see the relationship between our schemes and classical FHE as a strength of our result, via the following interpretation: classical FHE is sufficient to enable QHE for a large family of circuits, and perhaps by taking greater advantage of the fully homomorphic property of the classical scheme in some as yet unknown way, our ideas might be extended to larger classes of quantum circuits. With this in mind, and for ease of exposition, we use a classical fully homomorphic encryption scheme for all of our quantum homomorphic encryption schemes.
An additional contribution of ours is conceptual: in the context of quantum circuits, it had been known for some time now that the non-Clifford part of a quantum computation is the "difficult" one (this phenomena appears, e.g. in the context of quantum simulations [Got98] , fault-tolerant quantum computation [BK05] and quantum secure function evaluation [DNS10, DNS12, BOCG + 06]). This has motivated a series of theoretical work seeking to optimize quantum circuits in terms of their T-gate complexity [Sel13, KMM13] . In particular, Amy, Maslov, Mosca, and Roetteler [AMMR13] recently proposed T-depth as a cost function, the idea being to count the number of T-layers in a quantum circuit and optimize over this parameter. Our contribution adds to this understanding, showing that, in the context of quantum homomorphic encryption, the main challenge is to evaluate non-Clifford gates, the bottleneck being, more precisely, the depth of the T-gate part of the circuit.
Organization. Some preliminaries and notation are given in Section 2. We give formal definitions of quantum homomorphic encryption and related concepts, including security definitions, in Section 3; this allows us to formally state our results in Section 4. Section 5 contains a basic quantum homomorphic encryption scheme, CL, for Clifford circuits that is used as a basis for EPR, the entanglement-based quantum homomorphic encryption scheme (Section 6), and for AUX, the auxiliary-qubit based quantum homomorphic encryption scheme (Section 7).
Preliminaries and Notation

Notation
A negligible function, denoted negl(·), is a function such that for every polynomial p(·), there exists an N such that for all integers n > N it holds that negl(n) < 1 p(n) . As a convention, if a is a classical plaintext, we denote its encryption byã. Throughout this work we use κ to indicate the security parameter.
For a detailed and rigorous introduction to quantum information theory, we refer the reader to [Wat13] . In the remainder of this section, we give a brief overview of some of the necessary concepts, as well as our specific notation.
A quantum register is a quantum system, which we view as a physical object that stores quantum information. Focusing on the case of qubits with classical states labelled {0, 1}, we note that the contents of a quantum register are mathematically, modelled as the set of trace-1, positive semidefinite operators, called density operators, on X , where X is a complex Euclidean space. We denote the set of density operators on any space X by D(X ).
Quantum registers are typically denoted with calligraphic typeset, such as A, B. Two (or more) quantum systems, X and Y, form a composite system by the tensor product of the subsystems, X ⊗ Y. If ρ ∈ D(X ⊗ Y) is a state on the joint system, we write ρ X to denote Tr Y (ρ). If X and Y have the same dimension, we denote this by X ≡ Y.
A density matrix that is diagonal in the computational basis corresponds to a classical random variable. For a random variable X on some set Σ X , we define ρ(X) := x∈Σ X Pr[X = x]|x x|, the density matrix corresponding to X. A classical-quantum state is a state of the form
x . One special quantum state on any system X is the completely mixed state, 1 dim X I X , which we will sometimes denote by $ (where X should be implicit from the context). When X is interpreted as C S for some finite set S, then $ corresponds to the uniform distribution on S.
The trace distance between two states, ρ and σ, is defined ∆(ρ,
refers to any physically-realizable mapping on quantum registers. The identity channel on register R is denoted I R . Let Φ be a quantum channel acting on register A, and ρ AE a quantum system held in the joint registers A ⊗ E. Then to simplify notation, when it is clear from the context, we write Φ(ρ AE ) to mean (Φ ⊗ I)(ρ AE ).
We mention a special type of channel, a conditional quantum channel, which, on input the classical-quantum state x Pr[x]|x x| M ⊗ ρ A x , outputs the quantum state:
for quantum channels Φ x : D(A) → D(B).
Unless otherwise specified, a quantum measurement refers to a measurement in the computational basis. A quantum algorithm is a polynomial-time uniform family of quantum circuits, implementing a family of quantum channels.
Quantum Circuits
We work with the universal set of quantum gates consisting of single-qubit preparation in the |0 state, single-qubit measurements, as well as the following unitary gates: The set {X, Z, P, CNOT, H} applied to arbitrary wires (redundantly) generates the Clifford group, and adding any non-Clifford gate, such as T, is known to give a generating set for all quantum circuits. We note the following relations between these gates:
A classical circuit is layered if it consists of alternating layers of either all '+' gates or all '×' gates. The multiplicative depth of a layered circuit is the number of '×' layers. As we see in this work, a natural quantum analogue of '+' gates are Clifford group gates, while the analogue of the '×' gate is the T gate. 1 Thus, a layered quantum circuit consists of alternating layers of either all Clifford group gates, or T gates. Then the T-depth of a layered quantum circuit is the number of such T layers [AMMR13] .
Quantum One-time Pad
For a single-qubit system ρ in register R, and a, b ∈ {0, 1}, we denote by QEnc a,b : R → R the quantum one-time pad encryption and by QDec a,b : R → R the quantum one-time pad decryption [AMTW00] , namely:
It is easy to see that QDec a,b • QEnc a,b = I R . Furthermore, by specifying that (a, b) be chosen uniformly at random, we get that the encryption maps any input to the completely mixed state, since for all ρ,
Definitions
In this section, we formally define QHE schemes, including correctness and security. More precisely, in Section 3.1, we first review classical FHE, and then define QHE in the public-key setting. Section 3.2 carefully defines the security of QHE, by considering several definitions for security under chosen plaintext attacks, and showing that they are equivalent. Section 3.3 defines the correctness and compactness of QHE, culminating in a complete definition of quantum fully homomorphic encryption (QFHE, Definition 3.8). Section 3.4 deals with an important subtlety that arises in the quantum case: due to the no-cloning theorem, when a large system is encrypted with some auxiliary quantum information needed for decryption, that auxiliary information cannot be copied and given to every subsystem, but rather, the system must now be decrypted as a whole, rather than subsystem-by-subsystem. We also define a notion of compactness and quasi-compactness in this context. Finally, for technical reasons, one of our schemes (AUX) must be used in the symmetric-key setting, which we define in Section 3.5.
Classical and Quantum Homomorphic Encryption
Our schemes rely on a classical fully homomorphic encryption scheme; for completeness, we include a definition in Appendix A. Since our adversaries are modelled as being quantum polynomial-time, we need a further security guarantee on the classical scheme, namely that it is secure against quantum adversaries (see Definition 3.1). Fortunately, much of classical fully homomorphic encryption uses lattice-based cryptography, which exploits one of the few conjectured "quantum-safe" assumptions [MR09] . Among all known solutions, the scheme of [BV11] appears to be the best for our purposes, as it bases its security on the learning with errors (LWE) assumption [Reg05, Reg09] , which has been equated with worst-case hardness of "short vector problems" on arbitrary lattices. 
where (pk, evk, sk) ← HE.Keygen(1 κ ).
We note that a number of recent works examine the security of classical schemes against quantum superposition attacks [Zha12, BDF + 11, BZ13]. In this context, our definition of q-IND-CPA above models security for classical plaintexts only (with an arbitrary learning phase, since the public key is given). Furthermore, we note that a classical homomorphic encryption scheme that is q-IND-CPA, is also IND-CPA. The converse, however, may not be true (in particular, if the IND-CPA property depends on a computational assumption that is broken by quantum computers). Note, however, that any proof that a scheme is IND-CPA can be potentially turned into a proof for q-IND-CPA if all statements still hold when "PPT" is replaced by a "QPT" (see [Son14] ). We now give our new definitions for quantum homomorphic encryption. Note that in the quantum case, there are some choices to be made in this definition. In particular, in our definitions, both pk, the public encryption key, and sk, the secret decryption key, are classical, whereas the evaluation key is allowed to be a quantum state.
Definition 3.2 (QHE).
A quantum homomorphic encryption scheme is a 4-tuple of quantum algorithms (QHE.KeyGen, QHE.Enc, QHE.Eval, QHE.Dec):
1. Key Generation. QHE.KeyGen : 1 κ → (pk, sk, ρ evk ). This algorithm takes a unary representation of the security parameter as input and outputs a classical public encryption key pk , a classical secret decryption key sk and a quantum evaluation key ρ evk ∈ D(R evk ). 2. Encryption. QHE.Enc pk : D(M) → D(C). For every possible value of pk, the quantum channel Enc pk maps a state in the message space M to a state (the cipherstate) in the cipherspace C.
C that maps an n-fold cipherstate to an m-fold cipherstate, consuming the evaluation key in the process. 
Security of Quantum Homomorphic Encryption
We now define a notion of security for QHE analogous to the classical notion of indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks. As in the classical case, there are several possible definitions, ranging from a relatively simple experiment (Definition 3.3) to the situation of multiple messages (Definition 3.4). As evidence of the robustness of these definitions, we show that they are equivalent; this strengthens our results since security in the most general case follows from security for the simplest definition. The proofs of equivalency are similar to the classical case (see, e.g. [KL08] ), and are included in Appendix B for completeness. Finally, we note that, by taking the evaluation key, ρ evk to be empty, our definitions and theorems are trivially applicable to the scenario of quantum public-key encryption (i.e. without a homomorphic property).
CPA security. The CPA indistinguishability experiment is given below and illustrated in Figure 1 . The experiment interacts with an adversary A , which is a pair of polynomial-time quantum algorithms (A 1 , A 2 ) (which we also refer to as adversaries). The first algorithm A 1 implements a quantum channel D(R evk ) → D(M ⊗ E) conditioned on pk, where E is an arbitrary environment. The second algorithm A 2 maps D(C ⊗ E) to a bit.
Enc pk M C Figure 1 : The quantum CPA indistinguishability experiment.
The quantum CPA indistinguishability experiment PubK cpa A ,QHE (κ) 1. KeyGen(1 κ ) is run to obtain keys (pk, sk, ρ evk ). 2. Adversary A 1 is given (pk, ρ evk ) and outputs a quantum state in message space M, together with a state in an environment register E.
QHE (ρ) = QHE.Enc pk (|0 0|) and Ξ cpa,1 QHE (ρ) = QHE.Enc pk (ρ). A random bit r ∈ {0, 1} is chosen and Ξ cpa,r QHE is applied to the state in M (the output being a state in C). 4. Adversary A 2 obtains the system in C ⊗ E and outputs a bit r ′ . 5. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if r ′ = r and 0 otherwise. In case r = r ′ , we say that A wins the experiment. 
CPA-mult security. The CPA-mult indistinguishability experiment is similar to the CPA scenario above, but in this case the adversary chooses two t-tuples of messages, for any t ≥ 1, and the challenger returns encryptions corresponding to one of the t-tuples. The adversary's task is then to guess which of the two t-tuples of messages has been encrypted. The experiment is given below; the illustration follows closely the one in Figure 12 of Appendix B (but with single messages replaced by t-fold messages).
The quantum CPA-mult indistinguishability experiment PubK
cpa-mult
A ,QHE (κ) 1. KeyGen(1 κ ) is run to obtain keys (pk, sk, ρ evk ). 2. For r ∈ {0, 1}, and t ∈ O(poly(κ)),
A random bit r ∈ {0, 1} is chosen and (Ξ cpa-mult,r QHE ⊗ I E ) is applied to ρ (the output being a state in C ⊗t ⊗ E).
4. Adversary A 2 obtains the system in C ⊗t ⊗ E and outputs a bit r ′ . 5. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if r ′ = r and 0 otherwise. In case r = r ′ , we say that A wins the experiment. A quantum homomorphic scheme QHE is q-IND-CPA-mult secure if for all quantum polynomialtime adversaries A = (A 1 , A 2 ) there exists a negligible function negl such that:
Theorem 3.5 (Equivalence of q-IND-CPA and q-IND-CPA-mult). Let QHE be a quantum homomorphic encryption scheme. Then QHE is q-IND-CPA if and only if QHE is q-IND-CPA-mult.
The proof of the above theorem is given in Appendix B.
Correctness and Compactness of Quantum Homomorphic Encryption
Next, we give, in Definition 3.6, a notion that encapsulates "correctness" of both the encryption and evaluation operations, with respect to a specified class C of quantum circuits (when C is a strict subset of all computations, the literature sometimes refers to this as a "somewhat homomorphic" scheme). Note that in the classical context, it is common to restrict attention to circuits that output a single bit, since any deterministic string can be computed bit-by-bit. We cannot do this quantumly, as a quantum state cannot be described (or generated) one qubit at a time. We therefore consider correctness as a global property of the output. Furthermore, as quantum data can be entangled, we require that a "correct" scheme preserve this entanglement and thus explicitly include an auxiliary space in the definition below.
Definition 3.6. (C -homomorphic). Let C = {C κ } κ∈N be a class of quantum circuits. A quantum encryption scheme QHE is C -homomorphic (or, homomorphic for the class C ) if for any sequence of circuits {C κ ∈ C κ } κ and input ρ ∈ D(M ⊗n ⊗ E), with n = n(κ), there exists a negligible function negl such that:
where (pk, sk, ρ evk ) ← QHE.Keygen(1 κ ) and Φ Cκ is the channel induced by C κ .
We point out two properties of the above definition. First of all, we do not require that the ciphertexts be decryptable themselves, only that they become decryptable after homomorphic evaluation -however as long as QHE is homomorphic for the class of identity circuits, we can effectively decrypt a ciphertext by first homomorphically evaluating the identity circuit. Secondly, we do not require that the output of QHE.Eval be able to undergo additional homomorphic evaluations; indeed, in the case that the evaluation key ρ evk is quantum, it will in general be "consumed" by the QHE.Eval process, rendering any future applications of QHE.Eval impossible.
Analogously to the classical case, we define compactness (which we also parametrize by a class of circuits C ), which, intuitively, requires that the output of QHE.Eval be short -thus ruling out trivial quantum fully homomorphic encryption schemes where all the work of applying the circuit is delayed to the QHE.Dec stage (see the text following Definition 3.10 for an informal description of the trivial scheme, TRIV.HE).
Definition 3.7. (C -compactness). Let C = {C κ } κ∈N be a class of quantum circuits. A quantum encryption scheme QHE is C -compact if there exists a polynomial p such that for any sequence of circuits {C κ ∈ C κ } κ , the circuit complexity of applying QHE.Dec to an output system C ′ of QHE.Eval
Cκ is at most p(κ). (That is, the circuit complexity of decryption does not depend on the circuit complexity of C κ ).
If a quantum scheme QHE is C -compact for C the class of all quantum circuits, then we simply say that QHE is compact.
Although this work leaves open the central problem of quantum fully homomorphic encryption, we have established all the machinery relevant for a formal definition, which we include below.
Definition 3.8 (Quantum Fully Homomorphic Encryption).
A scheme QHE is a quantum fully homomorphic encryption scheme if it is both compact and homomorphic for the class of all quantum circuits.
Indivisible Schemes
In general, a quantum system is not equal to the sum of its parts. Because of this, for one of our schemes (as given in Section 6), it is convenient (if not necessary, by the no-cloning theorem [WZ82] ) to define the output of QHE.Eval as containing, in addition to a series of cipherstates corresponding to each qubit, some auxiliary quantum register, entangled with each cipherstate. Then the decryption operation, QHE.Dec must operate on the entire quantum system, rather than qubit-by-qubit. This is in contrast to a classical scheme, in which we could make a copy of the auxiliary register for each encrypted bit, enabling the decryption of individual bits, without decrypting the entire system. Definition 3.9. An indivisible quantum homomorphic encryption scheme is a quantum homomorphic encryption scheme with QHE.Eval and QHE.Dec re-defined as:
Eval in a standard QHE, this algorithm outputs an additional auxiliary quantum register R aux . This extra information is used in the decryption phase. Since the state of R aux may be entangled with the state of each C ′ , the system in R aux ⊗ C ′ ⊗m can no longer be considered subsystem-by-subsystem.
Dec sk is a quantum channel that maps an auxiliary register, together with an m-fold cipherstate, to an m-fold message in D(M ⊗m ).
We need to define compactness for an indivisible scheme (recall that here, there is no notion of separating the individual output systems).
Definition 3.10. (C -compactness for an indivisible scheme). Let C = {C κ } κ∈N be a class of quantum circuits. An indivisible quantum encryption scheme QHE is C -compact if there exists a polynomial p such that for any sequence of circuits {C κ ∈ C κ } κ with induced channels Φ Cκ : M ⊗n(κ) → M ⊗m(κ) , the circuit complexity of applying QHE.Dec ⊗m(κ) to the output of QHE.Eval
Cκ is at most p(κ, m(κ)). (That is, the circuit complexity of decryption does not depend on the circuit complexity of C κ ).
Note that the trivial quantum fully homomorphic encryption scheme, TRIV.HE is easily phrased in terms of an indivisible scheme. Informally, TRIV.HE is the following:
1. The algorithms TRIV.KeyGen and TRIV.Enc are taken from any quantum public-key encryption scheme.
2. The algorithm TRIV.Eval simply sets R aux to be the target circuit, C, and otherwise outputs the cipherstates corresponding to the encrypted inputs. 3. The algorithm TRIV.Dec first decrypts the cipherstates, then applies C and outputs the result. Clearly, TRIV is homomorphic, but it is not compact for all circuits, since the decryption procedure must evaluate the quantum circuit C, and so its complexity scales with G(C), the number of gates in C.
Although a decryption procedure with any dependence on G, or any other property of C, is not compact, it is still interesting to consider schemes whose decryption procedure has complexity that scales sublinearly in G (such schemes are called quasi-compact schemes [Gen09b] ). We give a formal definition that quantifies this notion for indivisible quantum homomorphic encryption schemes.
Definition 3.11 (quasi-compactness). Let S = {S κ } κ be the set of all quantum circuits over some fixed universal gate set. Let f : S → R ≥0 be some function on the circuits in S . An indivisible quantum homomorphic encryption scheme QHE is f -quasi-compact if there exists a polynomial p such that for any sequence of circuits {C κ ∈ S κ } κ with induced channels Φ Cκ : M ⊗n(κ) → M ⊗m(κ) , the circuit complexity of decrypting the output of QHE.Eval
Cκ is at most
This definition allows us to consider schemes whose decryption complexity scales with some property of the evaluated circuit. We consider such a scaling non-trivial when it is smaller than G(C), the number of gates in C.
Quantum Homomorphic Encryption in the Symmetric-Key Setting
We have defined quantum homomorphic encryption as a public-key encryption scheme. For technical reasons, our final scheme, AUX is given in the symmetric-key setting, so in this section we define functionality and security for symmetric-key quantum homomorphic encryption. In the case of classical homomorphic encryption, symmetric-key encryption is known to be equivalent to public-key encryption [Rot11] . In the quantum case, this is not known.
This section also contains the definition of a bounded fully homomorphic scheme, which we again require for technical reasons in our symmetric key scheme, AUX. Definition 3.12. A symmetric-key quantum homomorphic encryption scheme is a quantum homomorphic encryption scheme with QHE.KeyGen and QHE.Enc re-defined as:
1. Key Generation. QHE.KeyGen : 1 κ → (sk, ρ evk ). This algorithm takes a unary representation of the security parameter as input and outputs a secret encryption/decryption key sk and a quantum evaluation key
For every possible value of sk, the quantum channel Dec sk maps a state in the message space M to a state (the cipherstate) in the cipherspace C.
Next, we define a quantum homomorphic encryption scheme that is bounded by n, which forces the number of ciphertexts encrypted by sk to be at most n. Furthermore, the scheme maintains a counter, d, of the number of previous encryptions, which can be thought of as allowing the scheme to avoid key reuse. Definition 3.13. A bounded symmetric-key quantum homomorphic encryption scheme is a symmetrickey quantum homomorphic encryption scheme with QHE.KeyGen, QHE.Enc, and QHE.Dec redefined as:
1. Key Generation. QHE.KeyGen :
Security of Symmetric Key Schemes. In order to define indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks in the symmetric key setting, we must equip the adversary with an encryption oracle Enc sk (·). An adversary with access to an encryption oracle, A is a tuple of quantum channels (
The interaction of the adversary and the encryption oracle is shown in Figure 2 , and for the case of a bounded encryption scheme, in which the oracle also updates a counter, in Figure 3 .
QHE.Enc
A sk sk
Figure 2: An adversary A that makes at most q encryption oracle calls is a list of quantum channels A (1) , . . . , A (q+1) such that for j = 1, . . . , q, A (j) sends a message to an encryption oracle, and A (j+1) receives the output. The full interaction is shown on the right, but we use the figure on the left as a short-hand for this interaction.
Figure 3: An adversary A that makes at most q encryption oracle calls to a bounded encryption oracle is a list of quantum channels A (1) , . . . , A (q+1) with the interaction shown on the right. We use the figure on the left as a short-hand for this interaction.
Just as in the public key setting, we can define a quantum CPA indistinguishability experiment for the symmetric key setting, SymK 
) (q is the number of oracle calls before the challenger is called, and q ′ is the number of oracle calls after the challenger is called). The experiment SymK cpa A ,QHE (κ) is defined below, and shown in Figure 4 . The quantum symmetric key CPA indistinguishability experiment SymK cpa A ,QHE (κ) 1. KeyGen(1 κ ) is run to obtain keys (sk, ρ evk ). 2. A 1 is given ρ evk , and may make a polynomial number of calls to an encryption oracle QHE.Enc sk before outputting a quantum state in message space M and environment register E.
3. A random bit r ∈ {0, 1} is chosen and Ξ cpa,r QHE is applied to the state in M (the output being a state in C). 4. Adversary A 2 obtains the system C ⊗ E and may make a polynomial number of calls to an encryption oracle QHE.Enc sk before outputting a bit r ′ . 5. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if r = r ′ and 0 otherwise. In case r = r ′ , we say that A wins the experiment.
The quantum CPA experiment for symmetric key systems (left) and bounded symmetric key systems (right).
Definition 3.14 (Quantum Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attack (q-IND-CPA) for Symmetric Key Schemes). A symmetric key quantum homomorphic encryption scheme QHE is q-IND-CPA secure if for all quantum polynomial-time adversaries with oracle access, A = (A
), there exists a negligible function negl such that:
Similar to the case of public-key encryption (Section 3.2), it is straightforward to give the seemingly stronger variant of q-IND-CPA, q-IND-CPA-mult, which is defined identically to the public key case (Definition 3.4) but with an adversary having access to an encryption oracle. However, just as in the public key case, it turns out that these definitions are equivalent. The proof of Theorem 3.15 is virtually identical to that of Theorem 3.5, given in Appendix B.
Main Contributions
We now formally state our main results (formal schemes and proofs are given in Sections 5-7). Our first theorem, Theorem 4.1, establishes quantum homomorphic encryption for Clifford circuits.
Theorem 4.1. (Clifford scheme, CL) Let C be the class of Clifford circuits. Then assuming the existence of a classical fully homomorphic encryption scheme that is q-IND-CPA secure, there exists a quantum homomorphic encryption scheme that is q-IND-CPA, compact and C -homomorphic.
Next, we consider two variants of the scheme given by Theorem 4.1. Each variant deals with non-Clifford group gates -in our case T-gates -in a different way. The first scheme, described in Theorem 4.2 and formally defined in Section 6, uses entanglement to implement T-gates, resulting in a quantum homomorphic encryption scheme in which the complexity of decryption scales with the number of T-gates in the homomorphically evaluated circuit. Theorem 4.2. (entanglement-based scheme, EPR) Let S be the set of all quantum circuits over the universal gate set {X, Z, P, H, CNOT, T} (as well as single-qubit preparation and measurement). Then assuming the existence of a classical fully homomorphic encryption scheme that is q-IND-CPA secure, there exists an indivisible quantum homomorphic encryption scheme that is q-IND-CPA, Shomomorphic and R 2 -quasi-compact, where R(C) is the number of T-gates in a circuit C.
The compactness of the scheme EPR is nontrival for all circuits in which R 2 ≪ G, where G is the number of gates.
Our second scheme, formally defined in Section 7, is based on the use of auxiliary qubits to implement T-gates, resulting in a quantum homomorphic encryption scheme that is homomorphic for circuits with constant T-depth, as described in the following theorem: Theorem 4.3. (auxiliary-qubit scheme, AUX) Fix a constant L. Let S be the set of layered quantum circuits over the universal gate set {X, Z, P, H, CNOT, T} (as well as single-qubit preparation and measurement) with T-depth at most L. Then assuming the existence of a classical fully homomorphic encryption scheme that is q-IND-CPA secure, there exists a bounded symmetric-key quantum homomorphic encryption scheme that is q-IND-CPA, S -homomorphic and compact.
The QHE scheme in Theorem 4.3 can be seen as somewhat analogous to an important building block in classical fully homomorphic encryption: a levelled fully homomorphic scheme, which is a scheme that takes a parameter L, which is an a-priori bound on the depth of the circuit that can be evaluated. However, we note that in contrast to a levelled fully homomorphic scheme, in which operations are polynomial in L, the complexity of our scheme is a polynomial of degree exponential in L, so we really require L to be constant.
As previously noted, Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 are complimentary: the scheme EPR becomes less compact as the number of T-gates increases, while the scheme AUX becomes inefficient as the depth of T-gates increases.
Scheme CL: Homomorphic Encryption for Clifford Circuits
In this section, we present CL, a compact quantum homomorphic encryption scheme for stabilizer qubit circuits, which consist of qubit Clifford circuits combined with measurements and single-qubit preparation. This is a building block for the schemes that follow in Sections 6 and 7. The main theorem we prove is Theorem 4.1, which follows directly from Theorems 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.
By definition, Clifford circuits conjugate Pauli operators to Pauli operators [Got98] . In other words, for any Clifford C, and any Pauli, Q, there exists a Pauli Q ′ such that CQ = Q ′ C. Furthermore, applying a random Pauli operator is a perfectly secure symmetric-key quantum encryption scheme: the quantum one-time pad (see Section 2.3). Combining these observations, we see that it is possible to perform any Clifford circuit on quantum data that is encrypted using the quantum one-time pad. We can apply the desired Clifford, C, to the encrypted state Q|ψ to get Q ′ (C|ψ ). Now decrypting the state requires applying the Pauli Q ′ . If P can be described by the encryption key (a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 , . . . , b n ) -that is, Q = X a 1 Z b 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ X an Z bn -then Q ′ can be described by some key (a ′ 1 , . . . , a ′ n , b ′ 1 , . . . , b ′ n ) depending on C and (a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 , . . . , b n ). We describe this dependence by a function f C : F 2n 2 → F 2n 2 , which we call a key update rule. We need only consider key update rules for each gate in our gate set, which consists of single-qubit measurement, single-qubit preparation, and the one-and two-qubit gates in {X, Z, P, CNOT, H}. For a single-qubit gate C, since the only keys that are affected are those corresponding to the wire to which C is applied, an update rule can be more succinctly described by a pair of functions f C a , f C b : F 2 2 → F 2 such that when C is applied to the i th wire,
For the two-qubit CNOT-gate, the update rule is described by a 4-tuple of functions, since CNOT acts on two wires. We give the key update rules for all gates in Appendix C. By applying these update rules after each gate, we can update the key so that the output is correctly decrypted. (Such a technique was already used, e.g. in [Chi05, FBS + 14].)
This solution, however, requires that the key updates be executed by the party holding the encryption keys: an "easy" classical computation, but nevertheless a computation that is polynomial in the size of the circuit. In the context of quantum homomorphic encryption, the challenge is therefore to allow the execution of arbitrary Clifford circuits, while maintaining the compactness condition. Here, we present a quantum public-key encryption scheme which is a hybrid of the quantum one-time pad and of a classical fully homomorphic encryption scheme. This encryption scheme is used to perform key updates on encrypted quantum one-time pad keys, enabling the computation of arbitrary Clifford group circuit on the encrypted quantum states, while maintaining the compactness condition. More precisely, to homomorphically evaluate a Clifford circuit consisting of a sequence of gates c 1 , . . . , c G , we apply the gates to the quantum one-time pad encrypted message, and homomorphically evaluate the function f c 1 • · · · • f c G on the encrypted one-time pad keys a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 , . . . , b n , where • denotes function composition. To accomplish this, we will keep track of functions for each bit of the quantum one-time pad encryption key, {f a,i , f b,i } n i=1 . Since each of the key update rules presented in Appendix C is linear, each f a,i and f b,i is a linear polynomial in F 2 [a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 , . . . , b n ] (from the perspective of the evaluation procedure, a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 , . . . , b n are unknowns), so we refer to them as key-polynomials. Before we begin to evaluate the circuit, the key polynomials are the monomials f a,i = a i and f b,i = b i . As we evaluate each gate c j , we can update the key-polynomials corresponding to the affected wires by composing them with the key update rules. To compute the new encrypted one-time pad keys once the circuit is complete, we homomorphically evaluate each key-polynomial on the old encrypted one-time pad keys.
It is interesting to note that since the key update rules (Appendix C) for stabilizer circuit elements are all linear, for the scheme CL, the underlying classical fully homomorphic scheme would only need to be additively homomorphic.
We define our scheme CL as a QHE scheme. Here and throughout, we assume HE to be a classical fully homomorphic encryption scheme that is q-IND-CPA secure (see Definition 3.1 and Appendix A). As noted, such a scheme (based on the LWE assumption) could be derived from [BV11] . All of our schemes operate on qubit circuits, and encrypt qubit-by-qubit. Thus we fix M = C 2 . Ciphertexts will consist of quantum states in C {0,1} , combined with classical strings. Specifically, if C is the output space of HE.Enc, and C ′ is the output space of HE.Eval, then we define C = C C×C ⊗ X , where X ≡ C {0,1} , and
• Key generation CL.KeyGen(1 κ ). For key generation, execute (pk , sk , evk ) ← HE.Keygen(1 κ ). Output the obtained secret key, sk , and public key, pk . The evaluation key ρ evk takes the value of the classical state ρ(evk ).
• Encryption CL.Enc pk : D(M) → D(C). Encryption is defined as the quantum channel that outputs the classical-quantum state:
• Homomorphic evaluation CL.Eval c 1 , . . . , c G is a Clifford circuit. For every j = 1, . . . , G such that c j initializes a fresh qubit, we initialize a new qubit CL.Enc pk (|0 0|) and append it to the system. Let ρ ∈ D(X 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ X m ), be the composite system consisting of the input quantum system and the initialized qubits. Initialize polynomials f a,1 , . . . , f a,n , f b,1 , . . . , f b,n ∈ F 2 [a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 , . . . , b n ] by f a,i ← a i and f b,i ← b i for all i = 1, . . . , n. For j = 1, . . . , G such that c j is a gate or a measurement:
1 (c 1 , . . . , c m , ρ) (with registers permuted to fit the prescribed form).
• Decryption CL.Dec sk : D(C ′ ) → D(M). Forã,b ∈ C ′ , the output space of HE.Eval, decryption is given by the conditional quantum channel:
which can be implemented by first decoding the classical registers to obtain a = HE.Enc sk (ã) and b = HE.Enc sk (b), applying QDec a,b , and then tracing out C C ′ ×C ′ . We have chosen to present CL.Enc pk and CL.Dec sk as quantum channels, since they are easily seen to be polynomial-time implementable. Note, however, that for more complicated quantum channels such as CL.Eval we will generally prefer their description in terms of a high-level algorithmic description.
Analysis
We now analyse the various properties of CL.
Theorem 5.1. Let C be the class of stabilizer circuits. Then CL is C -homomorphic.
Proof. This follows from the circuits in Appendix C, as well as the homomorphic property of HE. In particular, since the decrypted values of the ciphertexts are correct (except with exponentially small probability), then Equation (6) is satisfied.
Theorem 5.2. CL is compact.
Proof. Let p be a polynomial such that the complexity of applying HE.Dec to the output of HE.Eval is at most p(κ) -such a polynomial exists by the compactness of HE. Then decrypting a single qubit of the output of CL.Eval has complexity at most 2p(κ) + 2, since we must decrypt two keys a and b and then apply X a and Z b , so CL is also compact.
Theorem 5.3. Assuming a classical fully homomorphic encryption scheme HE that is q-IND-CPA secure, the quantum homomorphic scheme CL is q-IND-CPA secure.
Proof. The main part of this proof will be to show that the classical ciphertexts HE.Enc pk (a) and HE.Enc pk (b) give at most a negligible advantage. We will then see that without these classical ciphertexts, the quantum CPA Indistinguishability experiment is independent of r from the perspective of the adversary. 
Let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be an adversary for PubK cpa A ,CL (κ). We will define an adversary A ′ = (A ′ Figure 5) . A ′ 1 (pk, evk): Run A 1 (pk, evk) to get a state ρ ME . Choose a uniform random bit r. If r = 0, discard the M subsystem and replace it with the state |0 0|. Choose uniform random bits a and b, and apply QEnc a,b , the quantum one-time pad, to M, relabelling the resulting system by X . Input (a, b) and (0, 0) to Ξ cpa-mult,s HE . A ′ 2 : Run A 2 to get a bit r ′ . Output 1 if r = r ′ and 0 otherwise. We now compute the probability that A ′ correctly guesses s, which we know must be at most 
We complete the proof by noting that when s = 0, since c = (HE.Enc pk (0), HE.Enc pk (0)), it is independent of a, b (see Figure 6 ). ′ . In this case, c is independent of a, b, and so the only dependence on a, b is the quantum-one-time-pad encrypted message in X .
Then from the perspective of A 2 , since a, b is uniform random, the system X just contains the completely mixed state $ (see Figure 7) . 
Scheme EPR: T-gate Computation Using Entanglement
In order to achieve universality for quantum circuits, we need to add a non-Clifford group gate, such as the T-gate. As noted in Section 1.1, if we apply the same technique as in Section 5 (i.e. to apply the T-gate on the encrypted quantum data) we run into a problem, since:
That is, conditioned on a, the output picks up an undesirable P error, which cannot be corrected by applying Pauli corrections. In [Chi05] , Childs arrives at this same conclusion, and then makes the observation that, in the case where a = 1, the evaluation algorithm could be made to correct this erroneous P-gate by executing a correction (which consists of ZP). As long as the evaluation algorithm does not find out if this correction is being executed or not, security holds. The solution in [Chi05] involves quantum interaction; this was recently improved to a single auxiliary qubit, coupled with classical interaction [FBS + 14]. In this section, we base the evaluation of the T-gate on a modification of this technique, as presented in Figure 8 . The modification is that we allow the auxiliary qubit to be prepared in a state dependent on the X-encryption key, whereas [FBS + 14] explicitly avoids this since it requires the auxiliary qubits to be prepared independently of the computation. Correctness of Figure 8 is proven in Appendix D.
As a proof technique (for establishing security), [FBS + 14] considers an equivalent, entanglementbased protocol. Here, we use the idea of exploiting entanglement in order to delay the correction required for the evaluation of the T-gate on encrypted data. The protocol is illustrated in Figure 9 .
Figure 8: Functionality of the T-gate gadget.
Figure 9: Evaluation protocol for the t th T-gate, applied to the i th wire. The key-polynomials f a,i and f b,i are in F 2 [V ]. After the protocol, V gains a new variable corresponding to the unknown measurement result k t . The dashed box shows part of the decryption procedure, which happens at some point in the future, after the complete evaluation is finished. Figure 9 shows that, via the use of the entangled state |Φ + = 1 √ 2 (|00 + |11 ), the conditional P correction can be delayed. The cost of this, however is that the value of the measurement result, k t on auxiliary register R t remains undetermined until a later point, when it is measured as part of the decryption algorithm. Thus we view the key update rules as a symbolic computation: each time a T-gate is applied, an extra variable, k t , is introduced.
For the first T-gate evaluation (t = 1), the evaluation procedure does not have the knowledge to evaluate f 1 = f a,i , where i is the wire upon which the gate is performed, in order to perform the correction. It is possible (using the classical scheme HE), to compute a classical ciphertext f 1 that decrypts to f 1 (a 1 , b 1 , . . . , a n , b n ). Thus, for this T-gate, the output part of the auxiliary system contains both f 1 and the register R 1 . As part of the decryption operation, compute f 1 ← HE.Dec( f 1 ), and apply P f 1 on R 1 before measuring in the Hadamard basis and obtaining k 1 . From the point of view of the evaluation procedure, k 1 is unknown and so it becomes an unknown part of the encryption key (in contrast with the previous keys, which are also "unknown", but to a lesser degree, since we have access to the classical encrypted values of these keys). The algorithm Eval continues in this fashion for values of t up to R; each time, the set of unknown variables increasing by one. Note that, according to Figure 9 , as well as the key updates rules (Appendix C), for all t, f t ∈ F 2 [a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 , . . . , b n , k 1 , . . . , k t−1 ] is linear (since c is a known constant), so we can write
. . , k t−1 ] and f ab t ∈ F 2 [a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 , . . . , b n ]. The cost of this construction is that each T-gate adds to the complexity of the decryption procedure, since, in particular, for each T-gate, we must perform a possible P-correction and a measurement on an auxiliary qubit. In addition, we cannot evaluate the key-polynomials, nor the f t , until the variables k t have been measured, so this evaluation must take place in the decryption phase, increasing the dependence on R, the number of T-gates. We make this dependence precise in Theorem 6.3.
We now formally define the indivisible quantum homomorphic scheme, EPR. As in CL, we have message space M = C {0,1} and cipherspace C = C C×C ⊗ X , where C is the output space of HE.Enc and X ≡ C {0,1} . However, since EPR is indivisible, the output space of EPR.Eval C has the form R aux ⊗ C ′ ⊗m . We require an indivisible scheme, because decryption of any one of the output qubits requires access to the auxiliary system. In our case, we have
, where R is the number of T-gates in C, C ′ is the output space of HE.Eval, and R t ≡ C {0,1} for each t. The classical parts of the auxiliary space allow us to output R linear polynomials in
, each of which can be represented with R+1 bits; as well as R HE.Eval outputs, corresponding to encryptions of {f ab t (a 1 , . . . , a n ,
Key Generation: EPR.KeyGen(1 κ ). The key generation procedure is the same as CL.KeyGen(1 κ ).
Encryption: EPR.Enc pk : D(M) → D(C).
The encryption procedure is the same as CL.Enc pk .
Evaluation: EPR.Eval evk . As in CL, apply gates in {X, Z, P, H, CNOT} directly on the encrypted quantum registers. For the T-gate, use the gadget defined in Figure 9 . This gadget differs from previous gadgets in that it creates an auxiliary entangled state, |Φ + . After the system of the i th wire, X i , is measured, relabel half of the Bell state as X i , and the other half as R t , which is returned as part of R aux . The full evaluation procedure is as follows.
, and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, initialize Let g 1 , . . . , g G be a topological ordering of the gates in C. For j = 1, . . . , G, evaluate g j using the appropriate gadget. 3. Let S be the set of output wires. Let L be the set of labels L = {(a, i), (b, i) : i ∈ S} ∪ {1, . . . , R}. For each α ∈ L, we want to homomorphically evaluate f α to obtain the actual (encrypted) key, but we can only actually evaluate the part of f α that is in the variables {a i , b i } i -the {k t } t are still unknown. Recall that we can write
• The m = |S| qubit registers {X i : i ∈ S} corresponding to the encrypted output of the circuit; • The R qubit registers R 1 , . . . , R R corresponding to auxiliary states created by T-gadgets;
• The polynomials {f k α } α∈L ⊂ F 2 [k 1 , . . . , k R ] and the homomorphically evaluated polynomials { f ab α } α∈L .
Decryption: EPR.Dec sk . In order to decrypt, measure the R t in order from 1 to R, computing f t (k 1 , . . . , k t−1 ) as required. Formally:
. . , k t−1 ) ⊕ f ab t and apply HP a to R t . (c) Measure R t to get k t . 2. Let S be the set of indices of the output qubit registers. For i ∈ S:
(a) Decrypt f ab a,i ← HE.Dec sk ( f ab a,i ) and
To each register X i , apply the map QDec a i ,b i . Output registers X 1 , . . . , X m .
Analysis
We now analyse the various properties of EPR. Since the scheme EPR uses the same KeyGen and Enc procedures as CL, the following theorem follows from Theorem 5.3.
Theorem 6.1. If HE is q-IND-CPA secure, then EPR is q-IND-CPA secure.
The next theorem shows the homomorphic property for all circuits (recall that this property is independent of compactness).
Theorem 6.2. Let S be the class of all quantum circuits. Then EPR is S -homomorphic.
The proof follows from the circuits in Appendix C, Figure 9 , as well as the homomorphic property of HE.
Since the complexity of the decryption procedure depends on R, the number of T-gates in the circuit, it is clear that the scheme EPR is not compact. However, by analysing the circuit's dependence on R, we can see that for a very large class of quantum circuits, EPR is non-trivially quasi-compact. The following theorem is immediate from the decryption procedure.
Theorem 6.3. Let p be a polynomial such that HE.Dec has complexity O(p(κ)). Then the decryption procedure EPR.Dec has complexity O(R 2 + Rp(κ) + mp(κ) + mR).
Thus, the dependence of the complexity of EPR.Dec on the evaluated circuit C is R 2 :
Corollary 6.4. Let R(C) denote the number of T-gates in a circuit C. Then EPR is R 2 -quasicompact.
This beats the compactness of the trivial scheme for all circuits C such that the number of T-gates is less than the squareroot of the number of gates; that is R ≪ √ G.
Scheme AUX: T-gate Computation Using Auxiliary States
In the previous scheme for quantum homomorphic encryption, we solved the problem of performing the P correction (Equation 9) by delaying the correction via entanglement.
In this section, we present a homomorphic encryption scheme, AUX, that takes a more proactive approach to dealing with the P correction. At a high level, AUX can be understood as the following: as part of the evaluation key, AUX.Keygen outputs a number of auxiliary states. These states "encode" parts of the original encryption key, and are used to correct for the errors induced by the straightforward application of the T-gate on the cipherstates. In more details, the auxiliary states encode hidden versions of P corrections, such as |+ a,k := Z k P a |+ (where k is a random bit and a is an encryption key) that are useful for the evaluation of the T-gate (see Figure 10) . In general (after having applied prior gates), the exact auxiliary state will not be available; instead, the Eval procedure combines a number of auxiliary states in order to create a single copy of a state that is useful for performing the correction. This combination operation, however, is expensive as it introduces new unknowns (in terms of new variables as well as "cross-terms"), that need to be corrected in any future gate application. Thus the size of the evaluation key grows rapidly. Since the rate is a polynomial whose degree is exponential in the T-depth, we can tolerate only a constant T-gate depth for this scheme to be efficient.
Figure 10: A T-gadget for the scheme AUX consists of the above circuit and key-update rules. We use var(k) to denote the set of variables in the polynomial k, which depends on the construction of the auxiliary state |+ f a,i ,k , described below.
We further specify that AUX is a symmetric-key encryption scheme. This is because AUX.KeyGen generates auxiliary qubits that depend on the quantum one-time pad encryption keys. Also, KeyGen takes an extra parameter 1 n , where n is an upper bound on the total number of qubits that can be encrypted (AUX acts much like a classical one-time pad scheme that picks a fixed-length encryption key ahead of time). After this bound on the number of encryptions has been attained, no further qubits can be encrypted. We will suppose without loss of generality that a circuit being homomorphically evaluated is on n wires. Furthermore, the number and type of auxiliary qubits will depend on the T-depth of the circuit to be evaluated, L. The scheme will not be able to homomorphically evaluate circuits with T-depth greater than L. We will see that the number of required auxiliary states grows super-exponentially in L, so we will require that L be a constant. Fix a constant L. We will now define a scheme AUX = AUX L that is homomorphic for all circuits with T-depth at most L.
Auxiliary Qubit Construction. In general, providing the necessary auxiliary qubits for each T-gate would require advance knowledge of the key f a,i at the time a T-gate is applied to the i th wire. Since this depends on both the circuit being applied and on the prior measurement results, we appear to be at an impasse. The key observation that allows us to continue with this approach is that, given two auxiliary qubits |+ f 1 ,k 1 and |+ f 2 ,k 2 , we can combine them to get |+ f 1 ⊕f 2 ,k , for some k, using the following circuit:
In general, by iterating this procedure, given auxiliary states |+ f 1 ,k 1 , . . . , |+ fr,kr , we can construct the auxiliary state |+ f 1 ⊕···⊕fr,k , where
j=1 f i f j for known values c i . Thus, if we give many initial auxiliary states of the form {|+ a i ,k a,i , |+ b i ,k b,i } i (with different keys for different copies), we can construct |+ f,k for f a linear function of {a i , b i } i∈ [n] . However, using an auxiliary state |+ f a,i ,k to facilitate a T-gate on the i th wire introduces the unknown k into f b,i . In particular, suppose f a,i = r j=1 t j for some monomial terms t j ∈ F 2 [V ]. Then we will need to construct it from auxiliary states |+ t 1 ,k 1 , . . . , |+ tr,kr , to get
i−1 j=1 t i t j . Thus, after the T-gadget, the new keys f ′ a,i , f ′ b,i will be in unknowns V ∪ {k 1 , . . . , k r }. Furthermore, because of the cross terms t i t j , the degree of the key-polynomials increases, so we can no longer assume they are linear. Since we can't produce |+ f 1 f 2 ,k from |+ f 1 ,k 1 and |+ f 2 ,k 2 , we will need to provide additional auxiliary states for every possible term. We discuss this more formally below and in Section 7.1.
Spaces. As in CL and EPR, we will work with qubits: M ≡ C {0,1} . In contrast to our previous schemes, the classical encryptions of quantum one-time pad keys will be part of the evaluation key (for convenience only), so we will have C ≡ C {0,1} . However, after evaluation, the classical encryption of the new one-time pad keys will be needed for decryption, so as in CL, we will have C ′ ≡ C C ′ ×C ′ ⊗ X , where C ′ is the output space of HE.Eval, and X ≡ C {0,1} .
Key Generation: AUX.Keygen(1 κ , 1 n ). The evaluation key contains auxiliary states that allow each of L layers of T-gates to be implemented. Thus, for each layer, since every wire must have the possibility to implement a T-gate, for each wire, we will need to be able to construct an auxiliary state |+ f a,i ,k for some k. Since we can add auxiliary states, we can construct this auxiliary state if we have an auxiliary state for each term in f a,i . Since f a,i depends on the circuit, which we do not know in advance, we need to provide an auxiliary state for every term that could possibly be in f a,i at the ℓ th layer of T-gates, for ℓ = 1, . . . , L.
We will now define sets of monomials T 1 , . . . , T L such that the keys in the ℓ th layer will consist of sums of terms from T ℓ (as proven in Lemma 7.1). Let V 1 := {a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 , . . . , b n }, and define
The monomials in T 1 represent the possible terms in the key-polynomials before the first layer of T-gates. Each of the up to n T-gates in the first layer will require a copy of each of {|+ t,k
with independent random keys for each, for a total of n|T 1 | auxiliary states with independent keys. More generally, for the ℓ th layer of T-gates, we will let T ℓ be the set of possible terms in the keypolynomials before applying the ℓ th layer of T-gates. We can see from the T-gadget, as well as the construction for adding auxiliary states that the keys from the previous layer's auxiliary states, k
, may now be variables in the key-polynomials, and that products of terms from the previous layer may now be terms in the key-polynomials of the current layer. (This is caused by auxiliary state addition. See Lemma 7.1 for more details). Thus, for ℓ > 1, we can define
We will then provide each of the n wires with an auxiliary state for each term in T ℓ , for ℓ = 1, . . . , L. We now make this more precise.
To each T ℓ , we will associate a family of strings {s (ℓ) (x)} x∈{0,1} V ℓ in {0, 1} T ℓ , defined so that for every f ∈ T ℓ , the f -entry of s (ℓ) (x) is s
. That is, s (ℓ) (x) represents evaluating every monomial in T ℓ at x. For instance, we have, for any strings a, b ∈ {0, 1} n , s (1) (a, b) = (a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 , . . . , b n ).
For any strings s, k ∈ {0, 1} n , define
For any string s, let s * n denote the concatenation of n copies of s. For any a, b ∈ {0, 1} n and
We can now define the procedure AUX.KeyGen(1 κ , 1 n ): 1. Execute (pk, sk, evk) ← HE.KeyGen(1 κ+n ). 2. Choose uniform random strings a, b ∈ {0, 1} n and
4. Output evaluation key: pk, evk,ã 1 = HE.Enc pk (a 1 ), . . . ,ã n = HE.Enc pk (a n ), 
Evaluation: AUX.Eval
For Clifford group gates, we apply the gadgets as in CL.Eval. For T-gates, we apply the gadget in Figure 10 . The full evaluation procedure is as follows: Let g 1 , . . . , g G be a topological ordering of the gates in C. For i = 1, . . . , G, evaluate g i using the appropriate gadget. 3. Let S be the set of output wire labels. For each i ∈ S:
(a) Homomorphically evaluate f a,i and f b,i to obtain the updated (encrypted) keys:
evk (ṽ : v ∈ V ). 4. Output in C ′ i the classical-quantum system given by:
• The encrypted keys {ã i ,b i } i∈S .
• The output register corresponding to the encrypted output qubit i of the circuit. The correctness of this scheme depends on two facts, which we prove in Section 7.1. The first is that for every unknown v ∈ V , we have an encrypted copy ofṽ, encrypted using HE.Enc. We need these to compute the final keys {ã i ,b i } using f a,i , f b,i ∈ F 2 [V ]. Finally, for each level ℓ, for each wire label i, we need an auxiliary state |+ t,k for every term that may appear in the key f a,i going into the ℓ th level. This allows us to construct the auxiliary qubit required to execute each T-gadget.
We remark that if we only had a classical encryption scheme that was homomorphic over linear circuits, and not fully homomorphic, then we could get the same functionality from a slightly modified version of this scheme, in which we include with every auxiliary qubit |+ s,k + s,k |, HE.Enc pk (s) -at the moment we only include some of these, but not those auxiliary states arising from products of terms, since we can compute products homomorphically. Since we have classical fully homomorphic encryption, we use this to slightly simplify the scheme, however the observation that the fully homomorphic property is not fully taken advantage of strengthens the idea that Clifford circuits are analogous to classical linear circuits in the context of QHE.
Analysis
We now analyse the various properties of AUX. Consider a layered quantum circuit C with L layers of T-gates. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the ordering of gates g 1 , . . . , g G has the property that if g i is a T-gate in level ℓ, and g j is a T-gate in level ℓ + 1, then i < j; that is, we completely evaluate level ℓ before we begin to evaluate level ℓ + 1.
Lemma 7.1. Let f a,i be a key-polynomial going into the ℓ th layer of T-gates. Then f a,i is a sum of terms in T ℓ .
Proof. We prove this statement by induction on ℓ. Before any gates have been applied, the keypolynomial are f a,i = a i and f b,i = b i for i = 1, . . . , n. We can easily see from the update rules that applying Clifford gates results in keys of the form f or f + f ′ , where f and f ′ were previous keys. Thus, after a Clifford circuit has been applied, all key-polynomial are sums of terms from {a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 , . . . , b n } = T 1 .
Let f a,1 , . . . , f a,n , f b,1 , . . . , f b,n be the key-polynomials going into the ℓ th layer, and suppose they are sums of terms in T ℓ . Let f ′ a,1 , . . . , f ′ a,n , f ′ b,1 , . . . , f ′ b,n be the key-polynomials right after the ℓ th layer of T-gates has been applied. If no T is applied on the i th wire, then f ′ a,i = f a,i and f ′ b,i = f b,i , so f ′ a,i , f ′ b,i are both sums of terms in T ℓ ⊂ T ℓ+1 . Suppose on the other hand that we apply a T-gate to the i th wire at level ℓ. From the T-gadget (Figure 10) , we see that after applying a T to the i th wire, we have new keys f ′ a,i = f a,i ⊕ c for a known constant c, so f ′ a,i is a sum of terms in T ℓ ⊂ T ℓ+1 ; and
where k is the auxiliary state key of the auxiliary state used to implement the gadget. If f a,i = t 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ t r , for t 1 , . . . , t r ∈ T ℓ , then we construct |+ f a,i ,k from auxiliary states |+ t 1 ,k 1 , . . . , |+ tr,kr for some k 1 , . . . , k r ∈ {k
j−1 j ′ =1 t j t j ′ for known c 2 , . . . , c r , which is the sum of terms in T ℓ+1 , since t 1 , . . . , t r ∈ T ℓ . Thus, f ′ b,i is the sum of terms in T ℓ+1 . Thus, after applying the ℓ th layer of T-gates, all key-polynomials are sums of terms from T ℓ+1 . To complete the proof, we simply observe again that Clifford circuits act additively on the keys, and so do not introduce new terms, so just before the (ℓ + 1) th layer of T-gates, the key-polynomials are still sums of terms in T ℓ+1 .
The bottleneck in this scheme is the number of auxiliary states required:
Lemma 7.2. The number of auxiliary states output by AUX.KeyGen(1 κ , 1 n ) grows in n as O(n 2 L−1 +1 ).
Proof. The number of qubits encoded in σ a,b,k aux is
From the definition of T ℓ , we see that:
|T 1 | = 2n, and for ℓ > 1,
So certainly for all ℓ > 1, |T ℓ | ≤ c|T ℓ−1 | 2 for some constant c, and thus
We thus have the following theorem:
Theorem 7.3. Let S n be the class of all quantum circuits on n wires with T-depth at most L, and let S = {S n } n∈N . Then AUX is S -homomorphic and compact.
We now consider the security of the scheme.
Theorem 7.4. If HE is q-IND-CPA secure, then AUX is q-IND-CPA secure.
We will prove Theorem 7.4 in several parts. To begin, we will show that an adversary that interacts with AUX.KeyGen can't do much better than an adversary that interacts instead with an altered version of AUX.KeyGen, KeyGen ′ , in which every classical encryption has been replaced with HE.Enc pk (0) (Lemma 7.5). Then we will be able to complete the proof by showing that an adversary interacting with KeyGen ′ instead of AUX.KeyGen can't win the q-IND-CPA experiment for AUX with probability better than 1 2 .
Lemma 7.5. Define a QHE scheme Thus, we can restrict our attention to adversaries that make no use of the classical encryptions, since they add at most a negligible advantage.
Proof. We will define an adversary A ′ = (A ′ 1 , A ′ 2 ) for the quantum CPA-mult indistinguishability experiment for HE, PubK cpa-mult A ′ ,HE (κ). Essentially, A ′ will run AUX.KeyGen, except it will use the challenger Ξ cpa-mult HE in place of HE.Enc pk , so that it is either running AUX.KeyGen or KeyGen ′ . It will then simulate the SymK experiment, and if A wins, it will guess that it ran the original version of AUX.KeyGen, and otherwise it will guess that it ran KeyGen ′ . A ′ 1 (pk, evk): A ′ 1 chooses uniform random bit strings a, b ∈ {0, 1} n and k ∈ {0, 1} N , where aux , pk, evk, c to A 1 . A 1 may make several oracle calls, which A ′ 2 can simulate, because it has a, b and so can run AUX.Enc. When A 1 outputs a message to the challenger, A ′ 2 samples a random bit r, and runs Ξ cpa,r AUX , which it can simulate, since it has a, b, and so can run AUX.Enc. A ′ 2 then gives the challenge to A 2 , and if A 2 outputs r, A ′ 2 outputs 1, and otherwise, A ′ 2 outputs 0.
We now calculate the probability that A ′ correctly guesses which of c 0 and c 1 it received from the challenger, which we know must be less than 1 2 + negl(κ + n) for some negligible function, since HE is q-IND-CPA, κ + n is the security parameter given to HE.KeyGen, and |m 0 | = |m 1 | = 2n + N = O(poly(n)) = O(poly(n + κ)). If A ′ received c 0 , then it acted as KeyGen ′ , whereas if it received c 1 , it acted as AUX.KeyGen. In the former case, the probability that A ′ correctly guesses 0 is the probability that A loses the SymK experiment when it interacts with AUX ′ , Pr[SymK cpa A ,AUX ′ (κ) = 0]. In the latter case, the probability that A ′ correctly guesses 1 is the probability that A wins the SymK experiment when it interacts with AUX, Pr[SymK 
Setting negl = 2negl ′ completes the proof.
The next lemma shows that the output of KeyGen ′ is actually (pk, evk, $), which is independent of a, b, k. The proof of Lemma 7.6 is mainly computational, and provides little insight, so we relegate it to Appendix E.
To complete the proof of Theorem 7.4, we simply show that no adversary interacting with AUX.KeyGen ′ can win the experiment SymK cpa with probability better than ). If q ≥ n, then the challenger just outputs ⊥, independent of r, so certainly in that case A cannot win with probability more than 1 2 , so suppose q < n. If q + q ′ + 1 > n, then the last q + q ′ + 1 − n oracle calls made by A 2 simply return ⊥, which A could simulate without actually making these oracle calls, so suppose without loss of generality that q + q ′ + 1 ≤ n.
The output of AUX
is (pk, evk, σ a,b,k aux ), and by Lemma 7.6, for any a, b, this is equal to (pk, evk, 1 2 N I 2 N ). Thus, the interaction of KeyGen ′ with the experiment is shown in part (a) of Figure 11 . KeyGen ′ chooses random bits a 1 , b 1 , . . . , a q+q ′ +1 , b q+q ′ +1 , for use in oracle calls and the challenge itself, but these are independent of the information given to A by KeyGen ′ . (The other random bits selected by KeyGen ′ , a q+q ′ +2 , b q+q ′ +2 , . . . , a n , b n and the string k, are independent of the interaction with the adversary, so we ignore them.)
It is then easy to see from Figure 11 that every call to the encryption oracle can be replaced by a channel that discards the input and returns a completely mixed state, since for any input ρ M , the encryption oracle returns
In other words, we have:
Here $ denotes the channel that outputs a completely mixed state, or equivalently, a uniform random variable. For the same reason, the call to the challenger Ξ cpa,r AUX can also be replaced with the channel that discards the input and returns $, since Ξ cpa,r AUX applies a quantum one-time pad using random keys a q+1 , b q+1 to the input or to |0 0|, and in either case, the resulting state is the completely mixed state. Thus, from the perspective of A , the experiment is independent of r, as shown in part (b) of Figure 11 . Thus, an adversary can not win with probability better than 
Figure 11: Proof of Lemma 7.7. Part (a) shows how KeyGen ′ interacts with the experiment. The channel $ outputs a completely mixed state, or equivalently, a uniform random variable. Since the random bits a i , b i are independent of the other outputs of KeyGen ′ , for each i, we can replace each of the oracle calls as well as the challenger with a channel that discards the input and returns a completely mixed state, as shown in part (b). Thus, the experiment is independent of r from the perspective of A , and so A can do no better than guessing r.
Combining Lemma 7.5 and Lemma 7.7 proves Theorem 7.4 immediately.
Conclusions and Open Problems
In this work, we have presented three quantum homomorphic encryption schemes. The first, CL, is a stepping stone to the other two, and is homomorphic and compact for the class of stabilizer circuits. The second, EPR, is homomorphic for all quantum circuits, but the compactness property degrades with the number of T-gates. In the third scheme, AUX, the complexity of the evaluation key and the evaluation procedure scale doubly exponentially with the T-depth, so that it is only homomorphic for circuits with constant T-depth, but it is also compact.
The clear central open problem in this work is to come up with a quantum fully homomorphic encryption scheme satisfying Definition 3.8, which must be homomorphic for all quantum circuits and compact. Our schemes EPR and AUX make progress towards this goal from two directions, but still leave open a full solution to this problem.
Our work can be seen as analogous to a number of classical results leading up to fully homomorphic encryption, including classical encryption schemes that were homomorphic for some limited classes of circuits, including limits in the multiplicative depth, as well as quasi-compact homomorphic schemes. In addition, we have attempted, in our security definitions and the theorems in Appendix B, to set the groundwork for a rigorous treatment of quantum homomorphic encryption, hopefully leading, eventually to quantum fully homomorphic encryption.
Definition A.2. (C -homomorphic). Let C = {C κ } κ∈N be a class of classical circuits. A scheme HE is C -homomorphic (or, homomorphic for the class C ) if for any sequence of circuits {f κ ∈ C κ } κ∈N and respective inputs µ 1 , . . . , µ ℓ ∈ {0, 1} (where ℓ = ℓ(κ)), there exists a negligible function negl such that Pr[HE.Dec sk (HE.Eval
where (pk, evk, sk) ← HE.Keygen(1 κ ) and c i ← HE.Enc pk (µ i ).
Definition A.3. (compactness). A homomorphic scheme HE is compact if there exists a polynomial s such that the circuit complexity of decrypting the output of HE.Eval(· · · ) is at most s(κ) (regardless of f ).
Definition A.4. (fully homomorphic encryption). A scheme HE is fully homomorphic if it is both compact and homomorphic for the class of all arithmetic circuits over F 2 .
B Equivalence of Definitions for q-IND-CPA
In this section, we prove Theorem 3.5 of Section 3.2, restated below:
In order to prove Theorem 3.5, we will first introduce an intermediate security definition, q-IND-CPA-2. We will show that q-IND-CPA is equivalent to q-IND-CPA-2, and then that q-IND-CPA-2 is equivalent to q-IND-CPA-mult. We note that the proof given in this section is easily modified to a proof of Theorem 3.15 -a similar statement for the symmetric key setting. The only difference in the symmetric key case is that adversaries can make calls to an encryption oracle. The main techniques in this section involve constructing an adversary A ′ that runs some other adversary A . If A is an adversary with oracle access, then another adversary with oracle access, A ′ , can easily run A , so the same ideas go through in an identical manner in the symmetric key case.
CPA-2 security. The CPA-2 indistinguishability experiment is given below and illustrated in Figure 12 . Figure 12 : The quantum IND-CPA-2 indistinguishability experiment.
The quantum IND-CPA-2 indistinguishability experiment PubK
cpa-2
A ,QHE (κ) 1. KeyGen(1 κ ) is run to obtain keys (pk, sk, ρ evk ). 2. Adversary A 1 is given (pk, ρ evk ) and outputs a quantum state ρ in M 0 ⊗ M 1 ⊗ E, where
pk )(ρ) . A random bit r ∈ {0, 1} is chosen and Ξ cpa-2,r QHE ⊗ I E is applied to ρ (the output being a state in C ⊗ E).
4. Adversary A 2 obtains the system in C ⊗ E and outputs a bit r ′ . 5. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if r ′ = r and 0 otherwise. In case r = r ′ , we say that A wins the experiment.
Definition B.1 (q-IND-CPA-2). A quantum homomorphic encryption scheme QHE is q-IND-CPA-2 secure if for all quantum polynomial-time adversaries A = (A 1 , A 2 ) there exists a negligible function negl such that: Proof. It is trivial to see that if a scheme is q-IND-CPA-2 then it is q-IND-CPA. Suppose a scheme QHE is q-IND-CPA. Then let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be any adversary for the experiment PubK cpa-2,r A ,QHE , so A 1 implements a quantum channel from D(R evk ) to D(M 0 ⊗ M 1 ⊗ E) conditioned on pk, and A 2 implements a quantum channel on D(C ⊗ E) that outputs a bit. We will use A to construct an adversary, A ′ for the experiment PubK cpa A ′ ,QHE as shown in Figure 13 . We define A ′ 1 by A ′ 1 (pk, ρ R evk ) = Tr M 0 (A 1 (pk, ρ R evk )), and A ′ 2 by A ′ 2 = A 2 . We now consider the probability that A ′ wins the q-IND-CPA experiment: Pr[PubK cpa A ′ ,QHE (κ) = 1]. If r = 0, the probability that r ′ = r is Pr[A 2 ((Enc(|0 0|)) ⊗ ρ E ) = 0]. If r = 1, the probability that r ′ = r is Pr[A 2 ((Enc pk ⊗ I E )(ρ M 1 ⊗E )) = 1]. Thus, the probability that this adversary correctly predicts r is 1 2
for some negligible function negl ′ , by the fact that QHE is q-IND-CPA. Consider a slightly different strategy, A ′′ = (A ′′ 1 , A ′′ 2 ), for the same experiment PubK cpa A ′′ ,QHE . This strategy discards the second message space, M 1 , and inputs the first, M 0 , into Ξ cpa,r QHE , that is A ′′ 1 = Tr M 1 (A 1 (pk, ρ R evk )). The new adversary A ′′ outputs the complement of the output of A : A ′′ 2 (ρ CE ) = A 2 (ρ CE ) ⊕ 1. We can then see that A ′′ correctly predicts r with probability
for some negligible function negl ′′ . The addition of (12) and (13), gives:
Since negl := negl ′ + negl ′′ is still negligible, we conclude that for some neglible function negl: QHE , C, as C i . Apply A 2 to the system C 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ C t ⊗ E, to get a bit r ′ . Output r ′ . We now consider the success probability of A ′ on PubK cpa-2 A ′ ,QHE . Let ρ = A 1 (pk, ρ R evk ). We first note that if A ′ 1 selects i, then if r = 0, the state passed to A ′ 2 is Ψ i (ρ), but if r = 1, the state passed to A ′ 2 is Ψ i+1 (ρ). So if r = 0, then the success probability is: 
Note that Ψ 0 (ρ) = (Enc pk ) ⊗t ⊗ I E (ρ It must be the case that t = O(poly(κ)), since A is a QPT algorithm, so t · negl ′ (κ) is negligible in κ. Setting negl = t · negl ′ completes the proof. 
C Key Update Rules for Stabilizer Elements
We review here the key update rules for performing stabilizer/Clifford operators on quantum data encrypted with the quantum one-time pad [Got98] . 
D Correctness of the T-gate Gadget
We give below a step-by-step proof of the correctness of the T-gate protocol from Figure 8 . The basic building block is the circuit identity for an X-teleportation from [ZLC00], which we re-derive here. Also of relevance to this work are the techniques developed by Childs, Leung, and Nielsen [CLN05] to manipulate circuits that produce an output that is correct up to known Pauli corrections.
We will make use of the following identities which all hold up to an irrelevant global phase: XZ = ZX, PZ = ZP, PX = XZP, TZ = ZT, TX = XZPT, P 2 = Z and P a⊕b = Z a·b P a+b (for a, b ∈ {0, 1}).
1. Our first circuit identity ( Figure 22 ) swaps a qubit |ψ with the state |+ and is easy to verify. 2. We can measure the top qubit in the above circuit and classically control the output correction ( Figure 23 ). We have thus re-derived the circuit corresponding to the "X-teleportation" of [ZLC00] . 3. Let the input be TX a Z b |ψ , and add two gates on the auxiliary wire, P a and Z k (Figure 24 ). Using the fact that P and Z commute with control, and applying identities given above, we get as output (using TX = XZPT):
This is equal to (simplifying, then pushing the first P to the end):
T|ψ since a 2 = a and P 2 = Z. 
|0 0| + |1 1| + i 2k+a |0 1| + i 2k−a |1 0|
2I 2 + (i 2+a + i a )|0 1| + (i 2−a + i −a )|1 0| = (2I 2 ) ⊗|s| = 2 |s| I 2 |s| .
Then it is easy to see that for any a, b ∈ {0, 1} n :
